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Abstract
We analyze the pass network among the players of the Span-
ish team (the world champion in the FIFA World Cup 2010),
with the objective of explaining the results obtained from the
behavior at the complex network level. The team is consid-
ered a network with players as nodes and passes as (directed)
edges, and a temporal analysis of the resulting passes network
is done, looking at the number of passes, length of the chain
of passes, and the centrality of players in the turf. Results of
the last three matches indicate that the clustering coefficient
of the pass network increases with time, and stays high, indi-
cating possession by Spanish players, which eventually leads
to victory, even as the density of the pass network decreases
with time.
Introduction
The hypothesis that a complex network analysis can help
understand soccer matches has been present for a long
time. Several teams, formal or informally, have performed
analysis of soccer matches from the point of view of the
network of passes formed along the match. One start-
ing point happened in 2004, when a competition to pre-
dict the four best-classified teams in the EuroCup that
was celebrated that year was done in the Redes (Span-
ish for “network”) social-network mailing list (in Span-
ish). The results, which completely failed to predict the
outcome, were published in http://revista-redes.
rediris.es/webredes/eurocopa2004.htm.
The main problem with these predictions, besides the out-
come, which was completely wrong (not even the two final-
ists, Portugal and Greece, were included in any of them) was
that they were looking at the static picture of the team as it
emerged from a previous match. It is quite clear that soccer
is a game of two players, whose networks clash. While there
must be some quantity that is kept from a game to the next,
and that quantity is related to the team structure (midfielders,
forwards, defense), the other team will do its best to prevent
that network to move information (that is, the football) from
one part to other, resulting in a quite unpredictable result.
On the other hand, the network does not have any kind of
spatiotemporal information. A network might show a per-
fect structure, well formed, with short distances from goalie
to forward players, but if it plays out of place or simply in its
own field it will not be able to obtain a good result. On the
other hand, if the network develops quite slowly with a low
number of passes and low precision (low transitivity), the
result will not be good either. In both cases, the static struc-
ture, while meaningful and a good qualitative description of
the overall game, is unable to reflect them.
In this paper, spurred by the victory of the Spanish selec-
tion in the 2010 world cup, we have performed a spatiotem-
poral analysis of the essential games that led to victory. In
this analysis, we have looked at the temporal evolution of
the number of passes, the centrality of the player and pitch
zones networks, and also at the length of the chains of passes
and its transitivity (taking thus into account the effect of the
opponent of simple ball losses). In this way, we take into
account both the complex network structure (reflected in the
power-law structure of the length of the number of passes
and overall network structure) and the spatiotemporal na-
ture of the game. In that sense, this paper is the first to make
that kind of analysis, which can latter be complemented with
other kind of static micro, macro, and meso measurements
of the same type.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: next, we
examine the state of the art in analysis of the outcome of
soccer matches. Then, the methodology used to extract data
from the match is presented. An overall examination of the
matches played by the Spanish team is subsequently per-
formed. We close the paper with some conclusions and
guidelines for future work.
State of the Art
Despite the huge cultural and popular interest that soccer
arises, being arguably the most popular sport (or maybe
spectacle) in the world, there have not been many scientific
approaches to sport performance and prediction. This was
true when Onody and de Castro (2004) wrote their often-
referenced paper in 2004, and it is still true today.
However, since then, several papers try to apply complex
network analysis to the soccer world. The above-mentioned
paper itself was seminal in its thoroughness: it analyzed the
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network of all Brazilian soccer players, and linked them if
they had shared a team, and found that several metrics (num-
ber of teams by player, number of goals by player, number
of games played) follow truncated power laws or exponen-
tial distributions. However, there was no attempt to relate
any of those quantities to performance. Could the number
of teams a player has participated be related to the number
of goals?
In general, the prediction of performance has concen-
trated on the hypothesis that a team has some kind of intrin-
sic fitness –see Heuer and Rubner (2009)– whose difference
between teams affect the probability (not the certainty) of
one beating the other. These studies have mainly concen-
trated on time series analysis (Heuer et al., 2010) but not
intra-game dynamics.
Since the pass data for several world-class events (Euro
Cup and World Cup) were made available, one of the authors
has been doing informal analysis on the team’s networks and
deducting from them some kind of qualitative prediction on
the result of a match. However, this analysis was not formal
at all, and even as differences between the network qualities
of different teams were appreciated, it was difficult to re-
late them either to the team fitness or to the match outcome.
The ARSfu´tbol team, based in Argentina, has done exten-
sive analysis of world-class events as well as local low-level
soccer teams (Bundio and Conde, 2009), concluding that the
performance of a team is mainly related to the existence of
a well-coordinated core of players (such as the players com-
ing from FC Barcelona in the Spanish national team or the
set of players from Porto FC in the Portuguese selection).
Even those post-hoc observations cannot be easily used for
predicting performance.
In this paper, we will look at the micro-dynamics of a soc-
cer team, the Spanish selection during the latest World Cup
in which they emerged as champions, bringing happiness to
millions of Spaniards all over the world. We will try to find
out which quantities made the Spanish team excellent by fo-
cusing on quantitative analysis of its game-play. This will
be used as a first step for a second leg of analysis which will
be focus on prediction.
Data extraction
In order to collect the data for the analysis, an important is-
sue was the fact that we intended to analyze the game play
from a spatiotemporal perspective. The spatial dimension
tries to capture the fact that a player can act in different parts
of the pitch and his role (and therefore the way he performs
and interacts with the teammates) may be different in each
of these zones. For example, a certain midfielder can have
a defensive role when the opposing team is attacking, and
have the teammates in the last defensive line as preferred
target for a pass whenever he regains control of the ball. On
the other hand, this very same player can adhere to a much
more combinative play when in offensive positions, interact-
Figure 1: Model of the football field for data extraction.
Playing zones.
ing more with wingers and other creative midfielders. To this
end, the pitch has been divided into nine zones as depicted in
Figure 1: four zones correspond to defensive positions (own
box, wingback lanes, and own midfield), other four zones
correspond to offensive positions (opponent’s box and mid-
field and wingers’ lanes), and the the very central zone of
the pitch which plays an important role for both initiating
static attacks and pressing the opponent in defense. For the
purpose of this analysis, each player is figuratively divided
into 9 different players depending of the pitch zone in which
they touch the ball (of course, most players only visit a lim-
ited number of zones throughout a given game).
As to the temporal perspective, our goal is to capture the
fact that a football game can go through different phases in
which a team can change its way of playing (e.g., the dom-
inant team can become dominated even if just sporadically
or the trainer may introduce tactical changes) or at least can
change its effectiveness (e.g., a player that was nullified by
an effective defense can resurface later on, when tiredness
prevents the defenders for keeping on tight marks). To ac-
count for this, we also keep track of the minute in which
each pass was done.
Once the kind of data we needed was defined, data extrac-
tion was done by ourselves, reviewing the knock-out games
played by Spain (contrarily to regular group games in which
a team can speculate with a draw or even with a somehow
minimal loss in order to qualify for the next phase, knock-
out games imply a win-loss situation and therefore the play-
ing style and tactics is effectively directed at winning the
game without depending on external factors1). These corre-
1Winning the game must be interpreted here as progressing on
spond to the games against Portugal (1/8th) (not analyzed in
this paper), Paraguay (1/4th), Germany (semifinals) and the
Netherlands (final). The raw data obtained from this visual
inspection consists of a list of passes with the format
<half> <minute> <player> <zone> <player’> <zone’>
indicating which player passed to which player, in which
minute, and in which pitch zones were each of them. As
mentioned before, each pair (player, zone) can be interpreted
as a virtual player for the purposes of network construction.
More precisely we consider a moving window of 15 min-
utes (which we believe is long enough to capture the state
of the game at any given instant) and build a series of di-
rected graphs Gi(V,Ei) where V = {(p, z) | p ∈ T, z ∈
{1, · · · , 9}}, T is the set of actual players in the national
team, and (u → v) ∈ Ei if, and only if, virtual player u
passed to virtual player v within the i-th time window.
This data was extracted by visualizing the matches by the
authors; data collection took approximately 4-5 times the
duration of matches2.
The Spanish Team Analysis
The Spanish national team attended the World Cup 2010 as
one of the favorites to win the trophy. While to some ex-
tent this was not a completely new situation from the local
point of view (and even the scientific point of view: Spain
hosted the world cup in 1982, and New Scientist published
an article proving why it should win due to home advan-
tage (Dowie, 1982)), in this case this consideration was quite
reasonable a priori, since Spain was the current incumbent
in Europe after winning the Euro Cup in 2008 for the 2nd
time in history (the 1st time dating back to 1964 in the Euro
Cup hosted precisely in Spain). This win at the European
level (and even more precisely the win over Italy in penalty
shootouts in the 1/4th game) was seen by many as a turning
point from the psychological point of view, finally break-
ing the “curse of the 1/4ths” that had been unescapable for
several other –very talented– Spanish teams. On reflection,
the current generation of players was probably the most ad-
equately suited for this purpose, since they had been surf-
ing on a winning wave in the national team since junior
stages (I´ker Casillas, Xavi Herna´ndez and Carlos Marchena
were members of the team than won the U-20 World cup in
1999) and were also part of the last dominant cycles of Real
to the next knock-out stage rather than, e.g., scoring more goals
than the opponent. For example, a team may decide to play very
defensively in order to reach the penalty shootout if they consider
they will be outplayed otherwise; be it as it may, this reflects a
definite and valid style, and is anyway not applicable to the games
considered in which Spain went effectively to win the game before
penalty shootouts.
2This data is available to the scientific community, with the pro-
vision that this paper is referenced should any publication arise
from the study.
Madrid CF and FC Barcelona at club level (holding numer-
ous trophies a European and International club level).
The lack of this “choking culture” that had haunted pre-
ceding generations, and the final discovery of a playing style
that players felt their own (incidentally a style that departed
by long from the traditional “Spanish fury” that had been the
national team’s trademark until them, and arguably a find-
ing that was in part possible due to the unfortunate series of
injuries of several players) led to the current success cycle
of the the team. While this style –informally termed “tiki-
taka” (an otherwise meaningless phrase that can be trans-
lated as “touchy-touch”) by the late Andre´s Montes, a fa-
mous TV commentator– is now considered a “dogma of
faith” by many in Spain, and is commonly assimilated to
that used by FC Barcelona (a claim based on the number of
players of this club in the national team), a deeper inspection
indicates that there are definite stylistic differences not only
between the national team and other clubs in Spain, but also
between the Euro 2008 team and the World Cup 2010 team.
The former had players such as Fernando Torres (then at
Liverpool FC) or David Silva and David Villa (then at Valen-
cia CF) at their highest performance level and played a much
more direct, faster combinative football. The latter team had
several of these players at a lower performance level, some
key players in midfield or defense were obviously two years
older, and other players more suited to passing play were in-
corporated. The result was a slower playing pace in which
the ball and players move rapidly, but in which the net ad-
vance is slow (yet steady). In the following we will analyze
some of the features of this style using the network informa-
tion collected as indicated in Section .
Quarter Final Match: Paraguay-Spain
Spain reached quarterfinals after winning 1-0 (a result that
would repeat itself in all remaining games) against Por-
tugal. While the result of that last game was tight (and
whether Villa, the scorer of the sole goal was in off side is
open to some question), from a global point of view Spain
was widely regarded as having dominated the game and de-
servedly progressing to quarterfinals, the historically unsur-
mountable barrier for the national team. The game was ap-
proached by Paraguay (a strong opponent, as demonstrated
by their being runner-ups in the Copa Ame´rica 2011) from a
tactical premise: to disrupt the flow of the ball among Span-
ish players. They succeeded at it for most of the game, with
Spain hardly achieving more than 3-4 consecutive passes
(see Figure 2) and only attaining a moderate pace of about
6 passes per minute (see Figure 3). Although Spain even-
tually settled to its usual combinative game (see clustering
coefficients in Figure 4), the first half was very irregular for
the team, with no single player emerging as the most cen-
tral (in terms of in-/out-degree), and with the game taking
place mostly in Spain’s defensive zone (see Figure 5). This
does not mean Spain was necessarily under attack, but that
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Figure 2: Paraguay-Spain. Average number of consecutive
passes. In this figure and all subsequent ones, the white line
is the mean and the shadowed area covers one standard error
of the mean above and below the former.
Paraguay’s pressing avoided Spain’s settling the ball in of-
fensive zones. The game’s turning point took place with two
penalty shoots failed successively by Paraguay and Spain
(low valley shown in Figure 3–right), after which Paraguay
lowered their defensive strength due to tiredness, and Spain
could finally enter into longer sequences of passes, with
Xavi Herna´ndez and Xabi Alonso emerging as dominant
players in the midfield.
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Figure 3: Paraguay-Spain. Passes per minute (right).
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Figure 4: Paraguay-Spain. Clustering rate.
Semi Final Match: Germany-Spain
The victory over Paraguay in the quarterfinals meant Spain
advanced for the first time in history to semifinals3, and a
general consensus that the team had fulfilled the minimum
expectations of the supporters. This meant that the semifi-
nal was approached as a game in which there was nothing
to loose (although it must be noted that the same held for
Germany, who had presented a very young team and a new,
less physical style, and were in a transitional year). Maybe
due to this lack of pressure, Spain put forward their best per-
formance in all the tournament.
The game was thoroughly dominated by Spain, who man-
aged to engage in a fast game (well above 6 passes per
minute, the ceiling reached for the most part of the game
against Paraguay, cf. Figures 3 and 7) and more elabo-
rated sequences of passes (roughly twice as much as against
Paraguay, cf. Figures 2 and 6). It is interesting to note that
the clustering coefficient was rather stable (the drop near
the end of the 2nd half corresponds to the final push ex-
erted by Germany once they were 1 goal down) and sim-
ilar to that reached against Paraguay, which indicates the
underlying passing pattern was maintained in both games
(but was more effective –i.e., resulted in longer sequences
of passes– against Germany). Xabi Alonso and specially
Xavi Herna´ndez during the 2nd half were the clear hubs of
the game (Paraguay had partly succeeded in disabling these
two players, hence the more disconnected game). Actually
the 2nd half saw the ball parked deeply inside the German
field (Figure 9–bottom, right), indicating a clear domination
of the game: sequences of up to 24 passes took place be-
3The previous best performance of Spain had been a 4th place
in Brazil’s World Cup 1950, an edition in which there was a small
league among the top-four teams.
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Figure 5: Paraguay-Spain. Zone-based player centrality.
fore Spain’s goal (which paradoxically was a header after a
corner kick).
Final Match: Netherlands-Spain
The great final took place against the Netherlands, a very
talented team that featured one of the best players of the sea-
son in the midfield (Wesley Sneijder, surprisingly left out of
the Ballon d’Or contest) and possibly the fastest and finest
winger in the whole tournament (Arjen Robben). Indeed, the
connection among these two players could have very well
tilted the balance in favor of Netherlands had not I´ker Casil-
las provided an outstanding performance. Despite the flair
available on the pitch, the Dutch team engaged however in
a very rough playing, forever iconized in Nigel de Jong’s
ominous tackle on Xabi Alonso’s chest4. To some extent the
tactical objective was similar to that of Paraguay’s –disrupt
the smooth flow of the ball in the Spanish team— yet the ex-
ecution was much more questionable (and so was the conde-
scending attitude of the referee towards it). The game settled
4http://l-g.me/deJong
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Figure 6: Germany-Spain. Average number of consecutive
passes.
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Figure 9: Germany-Spain. Zone-based player centrality.
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Figure 7: Germany-Spain. Passes per minute (right).
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Figure 8: Germany-Spain. Clustering rate.
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Figure 10: Netherlands-Spain. Average number of consecu-
tive passes.
for the most part in a very slow pace due to the number of in-
terruptions (Figure 12), and sequences of passes were gener-
ally short, analogously to the game against Paraguay. Unlike
the latter game, the Dutch team succeeded in disabling Xabi
Alonso but the balance of the game followed a similar pat-
tern in that the physical style of the Netherlands became less
consistent as time passed. The midfield was eventually con-
trolled by Xavi Herna´ndez and –despite two clear fast breaks
by Robben mentioned before– the ball advanced away from
Spain’s defensive zone. The average number of consecu-
tive passes gained momentum at the end of the 2nd half and
was rather stable during the 1st part of the extra time. Not
surprisingly, the pace of the game decreased steadily dur-
ing the extra time (Figure 13), due to both the exhaustion of
the players and the team strategy shifting to a safer mode of
holding possession in order to avoid conceding a late goal
and trying to exploit a more direct approach when possible.
Indeed, the clustering coefficient during the 2nd part of the
extra time is much lower than in remaining games (Figure
15), which is consistent with a less structured development
of the game and larger distances between team lines. The
whole extra time witnessed the emergence of Cesc Fa`bregas
(Figure 17), coming from the bench to dominate the mid-
field, providing eventually the assist that resulted in Andre´s
Iniesta’s decisive goal.
Conclusions and Future Work
This work has attempted to use some simple graph and net-
work metrics to analyze the performance and playing style
of the Spanish national football team in the World Cup 2010.
When analyzed from a temporal perspective, global mea-
sures such as the number of consecutive passes or the num-
ber of passes per minute provide a measure of the success
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Figure 11: Netherlands-Spain. Average number of consecu-
tive passes in the extra time.
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Figure 12: Netherlands-Spain. Passes per minute.
of the team in imposing its style (or alternatively the success
of the opposing team in disrupting the style of the Spanish
team). A deeper insight is obtained by observing the clus-
tering coefficient with captures the combinative nature of the
“tiki-taka” style. While prone to a kind of baroqueness in the
sense that many passes are often done in a short distance and
might be expendable, it is evident that it has prime value as
a defensive strategy, by depriving the opponent of ball pos-
session, one of the factors that is determinant in the game
outcome (Lago and Martı´n, 2007; Bate, 1988). Even in the
games in which the performance of the Spanish team has
been deemed worse by analysts and the general public, this
combinativeness imprint globally remains, with marked val-
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Figure 16: Netherlands-Spain. Zone-based player centrality.
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Figure 13: Netherlands-Spain. Passes per minute in the extra
time.
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Figure 14: Netherlands-Spain. Clustering rate.
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Figure 17: Netherlands-Spain. Zone-based player centrality in the extra time. Please note that player number 6, is Andre´s
Iniesta, the one that scored the goal against the Netherlands (and which eventually led to victory).
leys in the aftermath of scoring a goal (and the subsequent
push of the trailing team) and sporadically during the final,
a special game in which emotions and passion often led to
lower precision and less elaborated game-play.
There is of course much work to be done. From the pure
methodological point of view, it is of crucial importance to
keep analyzing other network measures such as node and
edge betweenness, which naturally capture the hubs and es-
sential associations in the distribution of the ball (let us note
en passant here as an example that the role of Sergio Bus-
quets was initially much criticized by the press and a large
part of the public due to his lower creativeness; however it
is clear that he was instrumental in providing balance to the
midfield; uncovering his role in the circuit of distribution of
the ball by means of an objective network metric would be of
foremost interest). Other measures such as eigenvector cen-
trality can be very valuable for this purpose. This can have
not just an explanatory value, but also a predictive value in
terms of identifying the weak points of the circuit that may
be targeted by the opponent. In addition to these method-
ological issues, it will be very interesting to deploy this kind
of analysis on further data both at club level (e.g., to iden-
tify similarities and dissimilarities between team an player
performance in their clubs and in the national team), and at
the national team level such as in the upcoming Euro 2012
in Poland and Ukraine or –looking beyond– the World Cup
2014 of Brazil.
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Figure 15: Netherlands-Spain. Clustering rate in the extra
time.
Appendix. Spain’s Squad Numbers
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# Name Position
1 I´ker Casillas Goalkeeper
2 Rau´l Albiol Defender
3 Gerard Pique´ Defender
4 Carlos Marchena Defender
5 Carles Puyol Defender
6 Andre´s Iniesta Midfielder
7 David Villa Forward
8 Xavi Herna´ndez Midfielder
9 Fernando Torres Forward
10 Cesc Fa`bregas Midfielder
11 Joan Capdevila Defender
12 Vı´ctor Valde´s Goalkeeper
13 Juan Mata Forward
14 Xabi Alonso Midfielder
15 Sergio Ramos Defender
16 Sergio Busquets Midfielder
17 A´lvaro Arbeloa Defender
18 Pedro Rodrı´guez Forward
19 Fernando Llorente Forward
20 Javi Martı´nez Midfielder
21 David Silva Midfielder
22 Jesu´s Navas Forward
23 Jose´ Manuel Reina Goalkeeper
